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STATn.mNT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (n;; MONrANA) 
Mr. President: 
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May 141 l97J. 
It is interesting to note the enthusiasm which has suddenly been 
kindled for the negotiation of mutual troop reductions between the Warsaw Pact 
and the NATO countries. On January 2, 1961, --1961--I made a similar proposal 
which was cold-shouldered by the preceding Democratic Administration. If the 
Senate will permit, I will read that brief statement in full at this point. 
********** 
It is ten years later. I may be forgiven~ I hope, if' I am 'less than 
for negotiations, 
sanguine about this sudden enthusiasm/. A time lag of a decade seems 'to me a 
I 
somewhat prolonged delay. in getting to them. 
Nevertheless, I was interested:ln .Brezhnev's proposal today. He 
suggested that negotiations get underway between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. I am delighted, too, that the response of the President has 
been in the affirmative. He is to be commended for whatever part he may have 
played in bringing about this stirring of diplomacy. Indeed, if the proposed 
amendment acted even as a partial precipitant, that .is all to the good. 
May I say, however, that the Brezhnev proposal does not in any way 
affect the rationale of the issue which is now before the Senate. In my 
judgment, a reduction in u. s. forces in Western Europe by 50 percent is in 
the interest of this nation with or without negotiations. What is involved 
in this proposal is a cut where a cut can be made. It is a cut in the excess 
and a discard of the obsolescent in the u. s. deployment in Europe, It is a 
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long-past-due adjustment, not in the Western alliance, not in the NATO 
. ffl,JJ-~ h' . . 
Treaty, but in its eloe::ted machinery. The prolonged put-off of this 
adjustment has resulted in a debilitating drain on the resources of 
this nation and this nation alone. The run has not been on the mark; 
it has been on the dollar. Lest we lose sight of that reality in an 
enthusiasm for negotiated mutual reductions with the Soviet Union, I 
would also remind the Senate that the run has not been on ihe ruble. 
It has been on the dollar. 
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. Copiee for your information 
r:~ .. :5 Opinion of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mc.ntana). 
For Release Monday a. m., January Z, 1961 
At the present time we have five divisions in Western Europe. Array-
ed against these limited forces are over ZS Russian divisions, deployed largely 
in East Germany, but also in Poland and Hungary. White it is true that the 
Western European nations, particularly West Germany, have available addi-
tional men under arms in W~stern Europe, their numbers are probably offset 
by the forces in the Eastern European satellites. The numerical imbalance 
as between the Russian forces and our own committed in Europe is overwhelm-
ingly weighted on the side of the Soviet Union. From this it is clear that the 
U. S. divisions in Europe, as such, have lost real meaning in terms of the 
shield concept of NATO. 
Protestations to the contrary, their significant meaning is a symbol 
of our commitment to join in the defense of Western Europe with all our 
strength and all our weapons if that area is invaded. A symbol of this kind 
would be no less a symbol if the u. s. commitment were- to-·consis-cortv/o· or 
- three cliVisions rather than five. One-vi'oufcThope, t1le-;efore; that it would be 
-·possible to offer to· reduce ou:r total commitments of"forces in Europe by two 
··- or three diviaions in turn for a Russian willingness to .cut their forces in Hun-
gary, Poland and Germany by a roughly proportionate number -- say somewhere 
- -in· excess of ten. · · · · · · · · 
That would be an important step towards easing tensions in Europe. 
l 
It also would permit the Russians to reduce their armaments expenditures -
which they are apparently anxious to do. It would permit us to save a substan-
tial amount of dollars in gold, which we are now draining out of the country, 
in no small part because of the numbers of troops with dependents and support-
ing structure which we maintain in Europe. At the same time the removal of 
two or three divisions with all of its dependents might make it possible to ease 
up on the financial pressure and, hence, to permit the dependents of those men 
who would remain in Europe to stay with them • 
Finally, if the Europeans felt their security weakened by a withdrawal 
of the American forces, they are in a financial position now to strengthen their 
own military forces, and could do so. 
In short, an i~~~'!.~~IJ..Jhi~-~.~\'.~...t.~~!?-..... s .. ~~~~g."'to..hnd.ng<-'abou~.-a. .conc.u.z:­
rent reduction of bothRussian and U.S. forces in Europe would be a rational 
--stepto-war ds· rio rmalc y in . Eu~~pe_ an'(( peac ~-: . It ·w~u ld 'b (t'~: .. s~te'p'lb.en~tf ti~g'"'"a.'il 
........ . . ' ...... ~ . .,'I ~·· .. ... ·;!":..;~ 
the nations involved and reflecting the improved stability, financially and 
otherwise of Vlestern Europe. These possibilities should be explored diplo-
matically on their own merit as a part of - but a distinct part of the over-all 
major questions of security in aLL Europe and disarmament. 
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